In the spring of 1981, a slim volume titled Getting to Yes arrived on the desks of corporate executives and diplomats alike. Written by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project, the book proposed a shift from "positional bargaining"—the stubborn digging-in of heels—to "principled negotiation." It argued that by focusing on interests rather than demands, parties could find mutually beneficial outcomes. The book sold more than 15 million copies and became the foundational text for a generation of MBA students. It was, and remains, a masterclass in the mechanics of the conversation.

Yet, forty years of observing high-stakes corporate mergers and international trade disputes suggests that the most elegant tactics often fail when the structural foundation is cracked. In 1998, when Volkswagen and BMW were locked in a battle for the soul of Rolls-Royce, the outcome wasn't decided by the cleverness of the lawyers in the room. It was decided by who held the intellectual property rights to the brand name versus who held the physical factory. Volkswagen paid £430 million for the factory, only to realize BMW had secured the rights to the name for a mere £40 million. BMW had a superior structural position; they didn't need the factory to own the brand, but Volkswagen couldn't sell a car without the name.